Description
The author presents contrarian arguments contesting mainstream US views on the danger of a Sino-American war over Taiwan's status. They contend that these countries' dispute about Taiwan is motivated by opposing strategic interests and security concerns rather than just, or even mainly, clashing values such as national reunification, sovereignty, democracy, and self-determination. The danger of a Sino-American confrontation has become more elevated recently due to a confluence of several concurrent developments. Despite this increased danger compared to any time since Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, they conclude that war is not imminent or likely-barring extreme hardliners and radical nationalists taking over policymaking in Beijing, Taipei and/or Washington. Despite a rising chorus urging Washington to commit more firmly to Taiwan's defense, they argue that the United States will not likely intervene directly on Taiwan's behalf. Even more controversially, they submit that Beijing will eventually prevail in this dispute.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction: My Main Arguments and Historical and Theoretical Perspectives; 2. A Perfect Storm? A Confluence of Ominous Developments; 3. Reasons Why Neither China, Nor the United States Would Let Go of Taiwan; 4. Strategic Ambiguity, Moral Hazard, and Prudent Statecraft; 5. Power Balance, Effort Mobilization, and the Long Game; 6. Conclusion: The Danger of Overreach and Self-Entrapment.
