Full Description
Common-law judgments tend to be more than merely judgments, for judges often make pronouncements that they need not have made had they kept strictly to the task in hand. Why do they do this? The Intricacies of Dicta and Dissent examines two such types of pronouncement, obiter dicta and dissenting opinions, primarily as aspects of English case law. Neil Duxbury shows that both of these phenomena have complex histories, have been put to a variety of uses, and are not amenable to being straightforwardly categorized as secondary sources of law. This innovative and unusual study casts new light on - and will prompt lawyers to pose fresh questions about - the common law tradition and the nature of judicial decision-making.
Contents
Preface; Table of cases; Prologue; Essay I. Dicta: introduction; 1. The civilian dimension; 2. Case law as common law; 3. 'Obiter' as legal entity; 4. Dicta depicted; 5. Oblique strategies; 6. Engines of confusion; 7. The necessity test; 8. Cheap talk; 9. Dicta and dicta; 10. Nearly law?; 11. Observation and authority; 12. The sources problem; Essay II. Dissent: introduction; 13. Some preliminary observations on dissent; 14. The nature of judicial dissent; 15. Without contraries is no progression?; 16. Stalemates and motivations; 17. Dissents, decisions, and courts; 18. The tug of unanimity in England's courts; 19. Dissent in an apex court; 20. When is a dissent not a dissent?; 21. Minorities as authorities; 22. Are we agreed?; Index.
