Description
Why are some autocrats more effective than others at retaining popular support even when their governments perform poorly? To develop insights into popular politics and governance across authoritarian regimes, this book stresses the importance of understanding autocratic blame games. Scott Williamson argues that how autocrats share power affects their ability to shift blame, so that they are less vulnerable to the public's grievances when they delegate decision-making powers to other political elites. He shows that this benefit of power-sharing influences when autocrats limit their control over decision-making, how much they repress, and whether their regimes provide accountability. He also argues that ruling monarchs are particularly well positioned among autocrats to protect their reputations by sharing power, which contributes to their surprising durability in the modern world. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Jordan and cross-national analysis of autocracies, the book illustrates the important role of blame in the politics of authoritarian regimes.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; 2. A theory of power-sharing and attributions under authoritarian rule; 3. Cross-national evidence on power-sharing and attributions in autocracies; 4. The Jordanian monarchy's strategic blame games; 5. How Jordanians attribute responsibility; 6. Power-sharing and attributions across Jordan's modern history; 7. How Jordan's blame games influence governance; 8. The royal advantage in power-sharing and blame shifting; 9. Power-sharing, blame, and the collapse of royal regimes; 10. Conclusion; Bibliography.
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- 洋書電子書籍
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シェーンベルク研究のコンテクスト
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- 和書
- 賢者の書 （新装版）
