Description
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field.The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies.The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Table of Contents
I. MONOPOLIZATION: CONDUCT1. A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary ConductB. Douglas Bernheim and Randal Heeb2. Predatory PricingKenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills3. Raising Rivals' CostsDavid T. Scheffman and Richard S. Higgins4. Predatory BuyingJohn E. Lopatka5. Competitive Discounts and Antitrust PolicyKevin M. Murphy, Edward A. Snyder, and Robert H. Topel6. Squeezing Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price SqueezesBarak Orbach and Raphael Avraham7. Innovation and Antitrust PolicyThomas F. Cotter8. Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman ActPierre Larouche and Maarten Pieter Schinkel9. Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and ChinaPing Lin and Hiroshi Ohashi10. Monopolization in Developing CountriesAlberto Heimler and Kirtikumar Mehta11. Business Strategy and Antitrust PolicyMichael J. Mazzeo and Ryan C. McDevittII. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACTUAL EQUIVALENTS12. Resale Price Maintenance of Online RetailingBenjamin Klein13. Exclusive DealingHoward Marvel14. Tying ArrangementsErik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp15. Vertical Restraints Across JurisdictionsRalph A. Winter and Edward M. Iacobucci16. Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and AntitrustFrancine Lafontaine and Margaret E. SladeIII. COLLUSION AMONG OSTENSIBLE COMPETITORS17. Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental EconomicsJay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach18. Cartels and Collusion: Empirical EvidenceMargaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow19. Tacit Collusion in OligopolyEdward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx20. Auctions and Bid RiggingKen Hendricks, R. Preston McAfee, and Michael A. Williams21. Screening for Collusion as a Problem of InferenceMichael J. Doane, Luke M. Froeb, David S. Sibley, and Brijesh P. Pinto22. Competition Policy for Industry StandardsRichard Gilbert23. Antitrust Corporate Governance and ComplianceRosa M. Abrantes-Metz and D. Daniel Sokol
