Full Description
This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.
Contents
Introduction George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco; Part I. The Normative Meaning of Actions: 1. Intentions, permissibility, and the reasons for which we act Ulrike Heuer; 2. Acting and satisficing Sergio Tenenbaum; 3. Interpretation without intentions Heidi M. Hurd; 4. Metasemantics and legal interpretation Ori Simchen; Part II. Normativity of Legal Authority: 5. Doing another's bidding Matthew Hanser; 6. Legal authority and the paradox of intention in action Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco; 7. The deliberative and epistemic dimension of legitimate authoritative directives Anthony Hatzistavrou; 8. Public transit A. J. Julius; 9. Ought we to do what we ought to be made to do? Cohen and Nagel on the personal and the political William A. Edmundson; 10. Juridical laws as moral laws in Kant's The Doctrine of Right Ben Laurence; 11. The relation between moral and legal obligation: an alternative Kantian reading George Pavlakos; Part III. The Social Dimension of Normativity: 12. Law's artefactual nature: how legal institutions generate normativity Kenneth M. Ehrenberg; 13. American Legal Realism and practical guidance Manuel Vargas and Joshua P. Davis; 14. The authority of conventions, norms, and law Bruno Verbeek; Select bibliography; Index.
