Full Description
What are the risks of terrorism and what are their consequences and economic impacts? Are we safer from terrorism today than before 9/11? Does the government spend our homeland security funds well? These questions motivated a twelve-year research program of the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California, funded by the Department of Homeland Security. This book showcases some of the most important results of this research and offers key insights on how to address the most important security problems of our time. Written for homeland security researchers and practitioners, this book covers a wide range of methodologies and real-world examples of how to reduce terrorism risks, increase the efficient use of homeland security resources, and thereby make better decisions overall.
Contents
1. Introduction. Improving homeland security decisions Ali E. Abbas, Milind Tambe and Detlof von Winterfeldt; 2. Probability risk analysis and terrorism risk Barry C. Ezell, Steven P. Bennett, Detlof von Winterfeldt, John Sokolowski and Andrew J. Collins; 3. Integrating stakeholder values into strategic planning through comparative risk analysis Henry H. Willis and Russell Lundberg; 4. Validating terrorism risk assessment models - lessons learned from eleven models John Lathrop and Barry C. Ezell; 5. Coping with uncertainty in adversarial risk analysis Vicki Bier and Tony Cox; 6. A risk and economic analysis of dirty bomb attack on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach Heather Rosoff and Detlof von Winterfeldt; 7. Regional transportation modelling for homeland security Maged Dessouky, Fernando Ordóñez, Zhihong Shen and Hongzhong Jia; 8. Economic consequences of terrorism and natural disasters: the computable general equilibrium approach Peter B. Dixon, Maureen T. Rimmer, Glyn Wittwer, Adam Z. Rose and Nathaniel Heatwole; 9. Economic resilience to terrorism and natural disasters Adam Z. Rose; 10. The regional economic impacts of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on oil refinery operations in the Gulf of Mexico Jiyoung Park, Peter Gordon, Yunkyung Kim, James E. Moore, II, and Harry W. Richardson; 11. Benefit-cost analysis and risk Scott Farrow; 12. Enhancing post-disaster economic resilience: public-private partnership for insuring terrorism Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan; 13. Economic impacts of changes in wait times at US ports of entry Bryan Roberts, Adam Z. Rose, Nathaniel Heatwole, Dan Wei, Misak Avetisyan, Fynnwin Prager, Charles Baschnagel and Isaac Maya; 14. Organizational decision processes Gregory S. Parnell and Barry C. Ezell; 15. A value model for evaluating homeland security decisions Ralph L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt; 16. Identifying, structuring, and comparing the objectives of Al Qaeda and Isil Johannes Siebert and Greg Keeney; 17. Models of multi-objective decision making Ali E. Abbas; 18. Achieving multiple objectives with limited resources using utility theory and control theory Ali E. Abbas and Dušan M. Stipanović; 19. Defender-attacker decision tree analysis to combat terrorism Ryan J. B. Garcia and Detlof von Winterfeldt; 20. Decision making for bioterror preparedness: example from smallpox vaccination policy Edward H. Kaplan and Lawrence M. Wein; 21. Stackelberg security games (sgg) basics and application overview Bo An, Milind Tambe and Arunesh Sinha; 22. Basic solution concepts and algorithms for Stackelberg security games Christopher Kiekintveld and Manish Jain; 23. Mixed integer optimization methods for solving Stackelberg security games William B. Haskell and Fernando Ordóñez; 24. Methods for addressing the unpredictable real-world element in security Jinshu Cui, Thanh H. Nguyen, James Pita and Richard S. John; 25. Learning to play Stackelberg security games Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab and Ariel D. Procaccia; 26. Evaluating deployed decision support systems for security: challenges, analysis, and approaches Matthew E. Taylor, Christopher Kiekintveld, Eric Shieh, Francesco Delle Fave and Milind Tambe; 27. Homeland security resource allocation games considering partially strategic attackers and equity Xiaojun Shan and Jun Zhuang; 28. Decision analysis by proxy for adaptive adversaries Richard S. John and Heather Rosoff; 29. Asymmetric prescriptive/descriptive game theory for counter-terrorism Jason R. W. Merrick and Philip Leclerc; 30. Near-misses and decision making under uncertainty in the context of cybersecurity Robin L. Dillon and Catherine H. Tinsley.
