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Full Description
Examines the use of preemption powers by Congress to completely or partially remove regulatory authority from state and local governments.
Congressional Preemption provides an in-depth account of the use of preemption powers by Congress to either partially or completely remove regulatory authority from state and local governments in a wide variety of fields. Author Joseph F. Zimmerman exposes the inadequacies of the two current theories of United States federalism-dual and cooperative-by exploring the impact of Congress' frequent use of its preemption powers since 1965. While the dual and cooperative federalism theories retain a degree of explanatory power, Zimmerman considers why they do not explain the profound systemic changes produced by congressional preemption. Other topics covered include congressional use of conditional grants-in-aid, crossover sanctions, tax credits, tax sanctions, and partial and complete redemption; the theory of political safeguards of federalism; and the Blackmun Thesis, which encourages states to seek relief from preemption statutes in Congress and not the courts. The book concludes with postulates of a broader theory of federalism and recommendations addressed to Congress to reinvigorate the federal system.
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Congressional Preemption
2. Establishment of a Federation
3. Spending Power Preemption
4. Complete Field Preemption
5. Imperium in Imperio and Limited Preemption
6. Judicially Determined Preemption
7. Metamorphic Federalism
Notes
Bibliography
Index
