P.ミルグロム『オークション:理論とデザイン』(原書)<br>Putting Auction Theory to Work (Churchill Lectures in Economics)


Putting Auction Theory to Work (Churchill Lectures in Economics)

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 368 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780521536721
  • DDC分類 381.1701


The most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used.

Table of Contents

1. Getting to work: 1.1 Politics sets the stage
1.2 Designing for multiple goals
1.3 Comparing seller revenues
1.4 The academic critics
1.5 Plan for this book
Section I. The Mechanism Design Approach: 2.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms: 2.1
2.2 Always optimal and weakly dominant
2.3 Balancing the budget
2.4 Uniqueness
2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction
2.6 Conclusion
3. The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence:
3.1 Hottelling's lemma
3.2 The envelope theorem in integral form
3.3 Quasi-linear payoffs
3.4 Conclusion
4. Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences:
4.1 The single crossing conditions
4.2 Deriving and verifying equilibrium
4.3 Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model
4.4 Expected-revenue maximizing auctions
4.5 Conclusion
5. Interdependence of types and values: 5.1
Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?
5.2 Statistical dependence and
revenue-maximizing auctions
5.3 Wilson's drainage tract model
5.4 Correlated types model interdependent values
5.5 Conclusion
6. Auctions in context: 6.1 The profit and
surplus contribution of an entrant
6.2 Symmetric models with costly entry
6.3 Asymmetric models: devices to promote
6.4 After the bidding ends
6.5 Conclusion
Section II. Multi-Unit Auctions: 7. Uniform
price auctions: 7.1 Uniform price sealed bid
7.2 Simultaneous ascending auctions
7.3 Conclusion
8 Package auctions and combinatorial bidding:
8.1 Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity
8.2 Bernheim-Whinston first-price package
8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions
8.4 Conclusion.