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Full Description
The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate.
In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms.
This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
Contents
1 The theory of managerial firms: setting the stage
1.1 Of firms and markets
1.2 U-form vs M-form, and opportunistic behaviour
1.3 Asset specificity, moral hazard and vertical integration
1.4 What does a firm maximize?
1.4.1 The theory of the growth of the firm
1.5 Agency theory
1.5.1 Moral hazard in teams
1.6 Market competition and incentives
2 Strategic delegation in oligopoly
2.1 Sales expansion
2.1.1 Cournot competition
2.1.2 Bertrand competition
2.2 Market shares
2.3 Comparative performance
2.3.1 Cournot competition
2.3.2 Bertrand competition and the mixed case
2.4 All eggs in one basket
2.4.1 Output level vs comparative performance
2.4.2 Market share vs comparative performance
2.4.3 Output level vs market share
2.4.4 The reduced form
2.5 Endogenous timing
2.5.1 Managers choose timing
2.5.2 Owners choose timing
2.6 Entry barriers
2.7 Empirical and experimental evidence
3 Mixed oligopolies
3.1 Strategic delegation and asymmetric information
3.2 Strategic delegation without agency issues
3.3 Delegation and tax policy
4 Collusive behaviour and horizontal mergers
4.1 Stock-based compensation and collusion
4.2 Output-based compensation and collusion
4.2.1 Extension: partial collusion with grim trigger strategies or optimal punishment
4.3 Horizontal mergers
5 Divisionalization and vertical relations
5.1 Vertical separation: supply chain management
5.2 Multidivisional firms
5.2.1 Multidivisionalization with managers
5.2.2 Divisionalization and mergers.../part contents
