Full Description
The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies.
More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value.
This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.
Contents
PART I. THE DISEMPOWERED SHAREHOLDER ; PART II. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM ; A. PATTERNS AND POLICY QUESTIONS - DARK SIDES AND LIGHT SIDES ; B. OWNERSHIP STAKES, OPERATING RESULTS, AND FINANCIAL RETURNS ; C. STRATEGIC HOLDING VERSUS COLLECTIVE INTEREST: EMPTY VOTING AND BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION ; PART III. PRIVATE EQUITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ; A. STRUCTURE AND MOTIVATION ; B. HOW HAS PRIVATE EQUITY PERFORMED? ; PART IV. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ; A. STRUCTURAL TREATMENT OF HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY: INVESTOR PROTECTION AND SYSTEMIC RISK ; B. REGULATION AND THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ; C. LAW REFORM: THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
