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Description
Traditionally, a justification for believing something is a priori is if, and only if, it is independent of experience. Throughout Western philosophy since Plato, some of the most divisive questions have been whether a priori justification exists, how it is possible, and how far it reaches. This book is structured around these three main questions. The first question has recently been modulated as to concern the significance of a priori justification: given the unclarities and presuppositions attached to standard explications of the notion of a priori justification, is it still a useful notion for epistemology? In a tight dialectic, the chapters in this part either attack or defend the theoretical importance of that notion. The second part concerns the sources of a priori justification: since a priori justification is not grounded in experience--our arguably best understood source of justification--in what can it be grounded? The chapters in this part explore the possibility that a priori justification is grounded either in intuition or in understanding. The third part concerns the extent of a priori justification: beyond core cases like mathematical proof, what methods can yield a priori justification? The chapters in this part investigate to what degree and why methods like introspection, testimony, and others have an import on a priori justification. Overall, the book showcases and furthers some of the latest contemporary trends in thinking about these questions.
Table of Contents
- 1: Three Questions about the A Priori
- I. The Significance of the A Priori
- 2: Albert Casullo: A Defense of the Significance of the A Priori: A Posteriori Distinction
- 3: Timothy Williamson: Reply to Casullo's Defence of the Significance of the A Priori: A Posteriori Distinction
- 4: Giacomo Melis and Crispin Wright: Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori
- 5: Timothy Williamson: More Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori: A Posteriori Distinction
- 6: Joshua Schechter: The Theoretical Significance of the A Priori: A Posteriori Distinction
- 7: Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis: Hybrid Virtue Epistemology and the A Priori
- II. The Sources of the A Priori
- 8: Laurence BonJour: In Defence of Rational Insight
- 9: C.S.I. Jenkins: The Mystery of the Mystery of Rational Insight
- 10: Paul Boghossian: Intuition and A Priori Justification
- 11: Elia Zardini: The Underdetermination of the Meaning of Logical Words by Rules of Inference
- 12: Laura Schroeter: The Conceptual Route to Apriority
- 13: Magdalena Balcerak Jackson: Can Epistemic Analyticity Explain the A Priori?
- III. The Extent of the A Priori
- 14: Célia Teixeira: Experience and the A Priori
- 15: Sinan Dogramaci: Why Can't Armchair Philosophers Naturalize the Mind?
- 16: Peter J. Graham: Testimony and the Scope of the A Priori
- 17: Sonia Roca Royes: A Priori Knowledge and Persistent (Dis)agreement
