メタ倫理学における記述主義と表現主義の超克 The Meaning of 'Ought' : Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics

著者名：Chrisman, Matthew

Oxford University Press（2015/10/23発売）

• 言語：ENG
• ISBN：9780199363001
• eISBN：9780190463625

Description

The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. In this book Matthew Chrisman develops a careful account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator, and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. This is a metanormative account that agrees with traditional descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth-conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their meaning. But Chrisman argues that this leaves important metasemantic questions about what it is in virtue of which ought-sentences have the meanings that they have unanswered. His appeal to inferentialism aims to provide a viable anti-descriptivist but also anti-expressivist answer to these questions.“This is a remarkably bold and interesting book. Chrisman challenges nothing less than the entire conceptual framework within which most previous metaethics (and indeed, much other contemporary philosophy) has been done, and advances a very ambitious rethinking of the theoretical space. It's not only ambitious, but also extremely imaginative and smart, and Chrisman's scholarship is at a rare level, as he has assimilated a literature that is unusually broad both in terms of field and historical scope.”-Stephen Finlay, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California

Table of Contents

1. Introduction1.1. The Ubiquity of 'Ought'1.2. Some Initial Theoretical Cartography1.3. Metanormative Theorizing and the Philosophy of Language1.4. Compositional Semantics, Some Basics1.5. The Word 'Ought'1.6. Plan2. 'Ought's, Obligations, Reasons, and Values2.1. Introduction 2.2. Formal Framework and Toy Analysis of 'Ought'2.3. An Initial Ambiguity View 2.4. Analyzing 'Ought' in Terms of Reasons2.5. Analyzing 'Ought' in Terms of Values2.6. Conclusion3. A Possible Worlds Semantics for 'Ought'3.1. Introduction3.2. From Modal Logic to Deontic Necessity and Possibility3.3. From Deontic Necessity to a Simple Possible Worlds Semantics for 'Ought'3.4. Some Reasons to Complicate the Analysis3.5. Kratzer's Improvements3.6. Application of Kratzer's Framework to 'Ought'3.7. The Weakness of 'Ought' Compared to 'Must'3.8. Conclusion4. Problems with Possible Worlds4.1. Introduction4.2. The Challenge of Dilemmas4.3. The Challenge of 'Ought-to-Do'4.4. Conclusion5. A New Semantic Rule for 'Ought'5.1. Introduction5.2. Is 'Ought' Polysemous between Agentive and Non-Agentive Readings?5.3. Imperatival Content5.4. A New Semantic Rule for 'Ought'5.5. Conclusion6. Metanormative Debate Renewed6.1. Introduction6.2. Truth Conditions as Ways Reality Could Be6.3. Truth Conditions as What One Ought to Think6.4. Truth Conditions as Positions in a Space of Implications6.5. Conclusion7. Conclusion7.1. Introduction7.2. Should the Metalanguage of Metanormative Theory be Nonnormative?7.3. What about Other Normative and Evaluative Words and Concepts?7.4. Moral Psychology7.5. The Epistemology of Normativity7.6. ConclusionAppendix of Proposed RulesBibliography