不完全契約の経済学に対する影響 The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics

著者名：Aghion, Philippe (EDT)/Dewatripont, Mathias (EDT)/Legros, Patrick (EDT)/Zingales, Luigi (EDT)

Oxford University Press（2015/12/22発売）

• 言語：ENG
• ISBN：9780199826223
• eISBN：9780190259013

Description

The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.

Table of Contents

PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986(1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986John Moore (University of Edinburgh)(2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of MarketsBengt Holmstr?m (MIT)(3) Remarks on Incomplete ContractingJean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)(5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied TheoryThomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries(6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New DirectionsWouter Dessein (Columbia University)(7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's ?Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions?Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) (8) Comment on ?Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions? by Wouter DesseinMichael D. Whinston (MIT) PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization(9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of FirmsPhillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)(10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen ?Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms,? P. John Roberts (Stanford University)(11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on ?Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms,? by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van ReenenW. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance(12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate ControlPatrick Bolton (Columbia University)(13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's ?Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control?Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)(14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for FinanceLuigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms(15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology LicensingJosh Lerner (Harvard University)(16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture CapitalSteve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)(17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small FirmsJeremy C. Stein (Harvard University)PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization(18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and FuturePatrick Legros (Universit? libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University)(19) Discussion of ?Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future?, by Patrick Legros and Andrew NewmanMathias Dewatripont (Universit? libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium)(20) Discussion of ?Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future?, by Patrick Legros and Andrew NewmanKai-Uwe K?hn (University of Michigan)PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade(21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of ProductionPol Antr?s (Harvard University)(22) Comment on Pol Antr?s: ?Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production?Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University)(23) The Theory of the Firm Goes GlobalDalia Marin (University of Munich)PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership(24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit FirmsPaul Grout (University of Bristol)(25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and HartHenry Hansmann (Yale Law School)(26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property RightsRohan Pitchford (Australian National University)PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy(27) International Treaties as Incomplete ContractsB?rd Harstad (University of Oslo)(28) Incomplete Contracts and Political EconomyGerard Roland (University of Berkeley)(29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of ConstitutionsGuido Tabellini (Bocconi University)PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity(30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin (Harvard University)(31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete ContractsJohn Moore (University of Edinburgh)(32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism DesignRichard Holden (University of New South Wales)(33) Complexity and UndescribabilityNabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication(34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and RenegotiationChristian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)(35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference PointsKlaus Schmidt (University of Munich)(36) Incomplete Contracting in the FieldAntoinette Schoar (Harvard University)