Description
The book offers a succinct overview of the technical components of blockchain networks, also known as distributed digital ledger networks. Written from an academic perspective, it surveys ongoing research challenges as well as existing literature. Several chapters illustrate how the mathematical tools of game theory and algorithmic mechanism design can be applied to the analysis, design, and improvement of blockchain network protocols. Using an engineering perspective, insights are provided into how the economic interests of different types of participants shape the behaviors of blockchain systems. Readers are thus provided with a paradigm for developing blockchain consensus protocols and distributed economic mechanisms that regulate the interactions of system participants, thus leading to desired cooperative behaviors in the form of system equilibria. This book will be a vital resource for students and scholars of this budding field.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; Part I. Cryptoeconomics Basics: 2. Cryptography basics; 3. Economic incentive; Part II. Consensus Protocol Design in Blockchain Networks: 4. Consensus mechanism basics: 5. Incentivized consensus mechanism; Part III. Mechanism Design In Blockchain Networks and Beyond: 6. Mechanism design basics; 7. Auction theory; 8. Contract theory; 9. Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; 10. Open questions about mechanism design in cryptoeconomics; References; Index.
