Answering Moral Skepticism

著者名：Kagan, Shelly

Oxford University Press（2023/09/26発売）

• 言語：ENG
• ISBN：9780197688984
• eISBN：9780197688991

Description

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments A Note to the Reader Introduction 1. What Would Morality Need to Be? 1.1 Job Descriptions1.2 Possible Elements1.3 Satisfying the Job Description2. Basic Positions in Metaethics 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism2.4 Moral Skepticism3. Nihilism 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism3.2 The Case for Nihilism3.3 Disregarding the Arguments3.4 Normative Nihilism4. Noncognitivism 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism5. Disagreement 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement5.2 The Implications of Disagreement5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement5.4 Nonconvergence6. Relativism 6.1 Moral Relativism6.2 Clarifying Relativism6.3 Arguing for Relativism6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories7. Knowledge 7.1 The Analogy to Observation7.2 Appearances7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions7.4 Reliability7.5 Intuitionism8. Evolution 8.1 The Argument from Evolution8.2 A Second Try8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics8.4 Common Ground8.5 The Continuity Problem8.6 Path Dependence9. Explanation 9.1 A Metaphysical Test9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts9.3 Reduction and Explanation9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts9.5 The Unrestricted Test10. Motivation 10.1 Motive Internalism10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation10.5 The Direction of Fit 11. Reasons 11.1 Reasons Internalism11.2 Reasons11.3 Refining the Argument11.4 Hypothetical Reasons11.5 Rational Support11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation12. Reductionism 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism12.2 The Nature of Reduction12.3 The Open Question Argument12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction12.6 Reducing Reasons13. Simple Realism 13.1 Simple Normative Realism13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity13.3 Nonnatural Properties13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals14. Moral Realism 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic14.2 Systematic Moral TheoryNotesReferencesIndex