Description
The 'Rhodesian crisis' of the 1960s and 1970s, and the early-1980s crisis of independent Zimbabwe, can be understood against the background of Cold War historical transformations brought on by, among other things, African decolonization in the 1960s; the failure of American power in Vietnam and the rise of Third World political power. In this history of the diplomacy of decolonization in Zimbabwe, Timothy Scarnecchia examines the rivalry between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, and shows how both leaders took advantage of Cold War racialized thinking about what Zimbabwe should be. Based on a wealth of archival source materials, Scarnecchia uncovers how foreign relations bureaucracies in the US, UK, and South Africa created a Cold War 'race state' notion of Zimbabwe that permitted them to rationalize Mugabe's state crimes in return for Cold War loyalty to Western powers. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. Historical background: 1960 to 1970; 2. The early 1970s; 3. Liberation struggles in Southern Africa, 1975–1976; 4. 'We don't give a damn about Rhodesia': the Geneva talks 1976; 5. Negotiating independence 1977–1978; 6. Negotiating independently, 1978; 7. The big gamble: the transition and pre-election period; 8. The 1980 elections and the first years of independence; 9. Gukurahundi and Zimbabwe's place in the 1980s cold war; Conclusion; Selected bibliography.
