Description
Disability raises profound and fundamental issues: questions about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; personal and social identity. It raises pressing questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. Yet it is only recently that disability has become the subject of the sustained and rigorous philosophical inquiry that it deserves. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability is the first comprehensive volume on the subject. The volume's contents range from debates over the definition of disability to the challenges posed by disability for justice and dignity; from the relevance of disability for respect, other interpersonal attitudes, and intimate relationships to its significance for health policy, biotechnology, and human enhancement; from the ways that disability scholarship can enrich moral and political philosophy, to the importance of physical and intellectual disabilities for the philosophy of mind and action. The contributions reflect the variety of areas of expertise, intellectual orientations, and personal backgrounds of their authors. Some are founding philosophers of disability; others are promising new scholars; still others are leading philosophers from other areas writing on disability for the first time. Many have disabilities themselves. This volume boldly explores neglected issues, offers fresh perspectives on familiar ones, and ultimately expands philosophy's boundaries. More than merely presenting an overview of existing work, this Handbook will chart the growth and direction of a vital and burgeoning field for years to come.
Table of Contents
IntroductionAdam Cureton and David WassermanPart I: Concepts, Models and Perspectives of DisabilityChapter 1: In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality RevisitedAnita SilversChapter 2: Theoretical Strategies to Define DisabilityJonas-Sébastien BeaudryChapter 3: Disability, Health, and DifferenceJerome Bickenbach Chapter 4: Habilitative Health and DisabilityLawrence C. BeckerChapter 5: Philosophy and the Apparatus of DisabilityShelley L. TremainChapter 6: Disability Liberation TheologyRosemarie Garland-ThomsonPart II: Well-Being, Adaptation, and Causing DisabilityChapter 7: Disabilities and Wellbeing: The Bad and the NeutralJoshua ShepherdChapter 8: Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What's the Moral Difference?Joseph A. Stramondo and Stephen M. CampbellChapter 9: Why Inflicting Disability is Wrong: The Mere Difference View and The Causation Based ObjectionJulia MosqueraChapter 10: Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being Sean AasPart III: Justice, Equality, and InclusionChapter 11: Contractualism, Disability, and InclusionChristie HartleyChapter 12: Civic Republican Disability JusticeTom O'Shea Chapter 13: Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities ApproachChristopher A. RiddleChapter 14: Disability and Partial Compliance TheoryLeslie FrancisChapter 15: Fair Difference of OpportunityAdam Cureton and Alexander KaufmanChapter 16: The Disability Case against Assisted DyingDanny ScocciaPart IV: Knowledge and EmbodimentChapter 17: Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and DisabilityJackie Leach ScullyChapter 18: What's Wrong With "You Say You're Happy, But " Reasoning?Jason MarshChapter 19: Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and VirtuesJosh DohmenChapter 20: Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences Jessica BegonPart V: Respect, Appreciation, and CareChapter 21: Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of RespectThomas E. Hill, Jr.Chapter 22: The Limiting Role of RespectAdam CuretonChapter 23: Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment John VorhausChapter 24: Care and Disability: Friends or FoesEva KittayChapter 25: A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status Linda BarclayPart VI: Moral Status and Significant Mental DisabilitiesChapter 26: Cognitive Disability and Moral StatusAlice CraryChapter 27: Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive DisabilitySuzy KillmisterChapter 28: On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the DebatesLicia CarlsonPart VI: Intellectual and Psychiatric DisabilityChapter 29: Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction PerspectiveJerome C. Wakefield, David Wasserman, and Jordan A. ConradChapter 30: Beyond Instrumental Value: Respecting the Will of Others and Deciding on Their BehalfDana Howard and David WendlerChapter 31: Educational Justice for People with Intellectual DisabilitiesLorella TerziPart VIII: Technology and EnhancementChapter 32: A Symmetrical View of Disability and EnhancementStephen M. Campbell and David WassermanChapter 33: Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended MindsZoe Drayson and Andy ClarkChapter 34: The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and StigmaCoreen McGuire and Havi Carel Chapter 35: Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled PeopleSara Goering and Eran KleinChapter 36: Second Thoughts on Enhancement and DisabilityMelinda C. HallPart IX: Healthcare Allocation and Assisted DeathChapter 37: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability DiscriminationGreg BognarChapter 38: Prioritisation and Parity. Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?Dominic JC Wilkinson and Julian SavulescuPart X: Reproduction and ParentingChapter 39: Why People with Cognitive Disabilities are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective TerminationChris KaposyChapter 40: Reproductive Choice, in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?Richard Hull and Tom ShakespeareChapter 41: Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality SeriouslyChristian MuntheChapter 42: Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian ApproachSamuel J. KersteinChapter 43: Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal IdentitiesMary Crossley
