Description
A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and available evidence on economic incentives for innovation.
Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Should Competition Policy Differ for the High-Technology Economy?
Chapter 3 Competition and Innovation Basics: Arrow versus Schumpeter
Chapter 4 Dynamics, Cumulative Innovation, and Organizational Theories
Chapter 5 Merger Policy for Innovation
Chapter 6 Competition and Innovation: Empirical Evidence
Chapter 7 Merger Enforcement for Innovation: Examples and Lessons for Remedies
Chapter 8 "We Are Going to Cut Off Their Air Supply": Microsoft and Innovation Harm From Exclusionary Conduct
Chapter 9 "Where is Foundem?": The Google Shopping Case and Antitrust Policy for Product Design
Chapter 10 Competition Policy for Standards
Chapter 11 Some Concluding Remarks on Innovation-Centric Competition Policy
Acknowledgments
Notes
References
Index
