Description
Probability has fascinated philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians for hundreds of years. Although the mathematics of probability is, for most applications, clear and uncontroversial, the interpretation of probability statements continues to be fraught with controversy and confusion. What does it mean to say that the probability of some event X occurring is 31%?In the 20th century a consensus emerged that there are at least two legitimate kinds of probability, and correspondingly at least two kinds of possible answers to this question of meaning. Subjective probability, also called 'credence' or 'degree of belief' is a numerical measure of the confidence of some person or some ideal rational agent. Objective probability, or chance, is a fact about how things are in the world.It is this second type of probability with which Carl Hoefer is concerned in this volume, specifically how we can understand the meaning of statements about objective probability. He aims to settle the question of what objective chances are, once and for all, with an account that can meet the demands of philosophers and scientists alike. For Hoefer, chances are constituted by patterns that can be discerned in the events that happen in our world. These patterns are ideally appropriate guides to what credences limited rational agents, such as ourselves, should have in situations of imperfect knowledge. By showing this, Hoefer bridges the gap between subjective probability and chance. In a field where few scholars have given adequate treatment to interpreting statements of chance, Hoefer develops a philosophically rich theory which draws on the disciplines of metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy of science.
Table of Contents
Analytic Table of ContentsList of BoxesIntroductionChapter 1: Metaphysical Preliminaries1.1 Humean Objective Chance (HOC): a first sketch1.2 The Humean Mosaic1.3 The Dialectics of primitive chance1.4 Chance as hypothetical infinite-run frequency: Propensities made respectable?1.5 Summing UpChapter 2: From Lewisian Chance to Humean chance2.1 PP2.2 Time and Chance2.3 Lewis' Best System Analysis of laws and chance2.4 Chance and Determinism2.5 Chance credence2.6 Summing UpChapter 3: Humean Objective Chance3.1 The basic features3.2 Examples3.3 The Best System of Chances3.4 More about the contents of the Best System3.5 Summing UpChapter 4: Deducing the Principal Principle4.1 Deducing the reasonableness of PP4.2 PP and the epistemology of HOC4.3 Other accounts and PP4.4 Summing UpChapter 5: Undermining5.1 Undermining - what is it?5.2 Is the contradiction real?5.3 The Lewis-Hall solution5.4 Independence for Humeans5.5 The NP solution redeemed5.6 Summing UpChapter 6: Macro-level and Micro-level Chances6.1 A Chance for all Setups?6.2 Epistemology of micro-derived chances6.3 Micro-derived chances and PP6.4 Summing UpChapter 7: Humean Chance in Physics7.1 Introduction7.2 Classical Statistical Mechanics7.3 Quantum Chances7.4 Summing UpChapter 8: Chance and Causation8.1 A reductive relation?8.2 Bob's great presentation8.3 The Cause-Credence Principle8.4 More on causationClosing remarksBibliography
