Description
Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.
Table of Contents
Foreword David Coady
1. An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories David Coady
2. The Conspiracy Theory of Society Karl R. Popper
3. Popper revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories? Charles Pigden
4. Of Conspiracy Theories Brian L. Keeley
5. Living with the Conspiracy Lee Basham
6. Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing Steve Clarke
7. Malevolent Global Conspiracy Lee Basham
8. Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory Brian L. Keeley
9. Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories David Coady
10. Appealing to the Fundamental Attribution Error: Was it All a Big Mistake? Steve Clarke
11. Afterthoughts on Conspiracy Theory: Resilience and Ubiquity Lee Basham
12. Complots of Mischief Charles Pigden
13. The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories David Coady
