Description
The authors present a vital analysis of the foreign policy-making processes of the two Bush administrations prior to the attacks on Iraq. In a thorough comparison, they show how both presidents used historical analogies to evaluate information, relied on instinct to formulate decisions, and drew on moral language to justify their choices.
Table of Contents
Two Surprises, Two Wars, Two Presidents, One Family Alternative Theories of Foreign Policy-Making Two Harmful Surprises The Logic of Surprise Versus The Logic of Surprise Avoidance The Apple Sometimes Falls Close to the Tree The Absence of a Rational Process
-
- 洋書電子書籍
- Intelligent Systems…
-
- 洋書電子書籍
- Testing and Validat…
-
- 洋書電子書籍
- The Reception of th…
-
- 洋書電子書籍
- John Ruskin's Corre…
-
- 洋書電子書籍
- Pathways to Profess…



