Description
This edited volume explores the significance of the earlyHelsinki process as a means of redefining and broadening the concept of security during the latter half of the Cold War. The early Helsinki process introduced innovative confidence-building measures, and made human rights a requirement of a legitimate and well-functioning international sys
Table of Contents
Part1: Introduction 1. New Perspectives on the Origins of the CSCE Process Andreas Wenger and Vojtech Mastny Part2: The Superpowers and European Détente 2. North America, Atlanticism, and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act Michael Cotey Morgan 3. Henry Kissinger and the Reconceptualization of European Security, 1969–75 Jeremi Suri 4. The USSR and the Helsinki Process, 1969–75: Optimism, Doubt, or Defiance? Marie-Pierre Rey Part3: Eastern Strategies in the CSCE 5. The Warsaw Pact and the European Security Conference, 1964–69: Sovereignty, Hegemony, and the German Question Douglas Selvage 6. The GDR’s Targets in the Early CSCE Process: Another Missed Opportunity to Freeze the Division of Germany, 1969–73 Federica Caciagli 7. ‘Europe Must Not Become Greater Finland’: Opponents of the CSCE: The German CDU/CSU and China Bernd Schaefer Part4: Western Strategies in the CSCE 8. The EC-Nine, the CSCE, and the Changing Pattern of European Security Daniel Möckli 9. From Linkage to Freer Movement: The Federal Republic of Germany and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–72 Petri Hakkarainen 10. ‘It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win’: Human Rights, ‘Détente’, and the CSCE Floribert Baudet Part5: The Neutrals – Economics – Military Security 11. Expanding the East-West Dialogue beyond the Bloc Division: The Neutrals as Negotiators and Mediators, 1969–75 Christian Nuenlist 12. Helsinki and Rambouillet: US Attitudes towards Trade and Security during the Early CSCE Process, 1972–75 Duccio Basosi 13. The Link between CSCE and MBFR: Two Sprouts from One Bulb Helga Haftendorn
