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Full Description
Investigates the strategy and intent of the American president in pursuit of national security, using a case study approach spanning the last century.
Strategic Direction takes inspiration from the following sentence in Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy: "In the American system of government, in which the president is the only nationally elected official, coherence in foreign policy emerges—if at all—from presidential pronouncements." The conditional phrase—if at at all—suggests coherence doesn't happen by itself, doesn't happen very often, and doesn't last very long. Why not?
To answer this question, Strategic Direction uses a case study approach spanning 1915-2015. The first case study begins in 1915 when Woodrow Wilson justifies his decision to remain neutral in the first world war. The last case study ends in 2015 when Barack Obama endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Through an exploration of verbal and written communication, including documents, executive orders, memorandums, and other materials, this book examines how presidents determine and pursue their foreign policy priorities.
Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1: Test Case: Wilson & his Critics. This case begins in 1915 with Wilson's analysis of
the "unstable equilibrium" in Europe, then his postwar advocacy for the Treaty of Versailles and
US membership in the League of Nations. It ends with Wilson's immediate successors (Harding,
Coolidge, and Hoover) who put their faith in the Washington Naval Treaty and the theory of
arms control and disarmament.
Chapter 2: Roosevelt & Total War. This is the longest case partly because Franklin Roosevelt
serves many years as president, and partly because the Good Neighbor policy (which Roosevelt
introduces in his first inaugural) is a case-within-a-case. Years later, Roosevelt begins using total
war as a pejorative term, but this changes after Pearl Harbor and it becomes US policy. There is
no precise definition, but total war is a combination of industrial mobilization, readiness, and
deterrence.
Chapter 3: Truman's New Paradigm. This case continues with the policy of total war under
Harry Truman until December 1945 when Truman calls for a comprehensive national security
program. The phrase "national security" is not new to the presidential lexicon. However, the way
Truman uses it—and every president after him—national security is a new paradigm which
transcends foreign and defense policy and affects everything the government does. In addition,
this chapter introduces NSC-68, the classified policy paper written in 1950 by an interagency
study group (declassified in 1975) which recommends the policy of containment.
Chapter 4: Eisenhower & Mutual Security. Dwight Eisenhower begins his presidency by
calling for armistice in Korea and proposing arms control and disarmament negotiations with the
Soviet Union. In May 1953 (following the death of Josef Stalin) Eisenhower begins a tireless
campaign for a system of mutual security, which he considers to be the most cost-effective way
to project power and prevent war. As a strategic concept, mutual security originates from
Truman's 1947 request for military assistance to Greece and Turkey. But Eisenhower believes it
should be permanent national policy.
Chapter 5: Kennedy's Stylistic Analysis. This case begins with John Kennedy's Inaugural
Address and a reminder that good reasoning and good communication are the building blocks of
coherence. Kennedy is a great communicator, exceptionally good on camera, but his
inauguration speech and other public statements are full of vague promises, loaded phrases, and
emotionalism. This chapter contains a case-within-a-case, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when
Kennedy anticipates an emergent threat and demonstrates effective crisis management.
Chapter 6: Johnson's Many Principles. The purpose of this case isn't to revisit the lessons of
Vietnam. Instead, we focus on Johnson's preference for abstract principles (theoretical
perfection) and his avoidance of rigorous analysis. Johnson is a skilled politician—at least when
it comes to domestic politics—but international politics doesn't suit him or interest him the same
way. For example, his one overriding rule is that foreign policy must always be an extension of
domestic policy. However, Johnson's principles are neither certain nor fixed, too numerous, and
too inconsistent to provide sufficient planning guidance.
Chapter 7: Nixon's Structure of Peace. Richard Nixon's first Inaugural Address (1969) is
unremarkable except for one phrase: the structure of peace. Several of Nixon's predecessors use
this phrase, beginning with Wilson in 1919, followed by Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and
Johnson, but only Nixon dedicates his presidency to it. The structure of peace is not an artifact of
the Cold War, not aimed at the Soviet Union (unlike the policy of containment), and not
explicitly ideological. Most importantly, the structure of peace is Nixon's long-term vision for
the US's role in the world after the Vietnam War.
Chapter 8: Carter & Human Rights. On Inauguration Day, Jimmy Carter does something
unusual. He records a message on foreign policy for citizens of the world, for those who cannot
vote in US elections but are affected by US foreign policy. In Carter's Inaugural Address, he
says his commitment to human rights is absolute. The problem is that human rights is his first
principle, his course of action, and his strategy all in one. There is no logical sequence, and no
difference at any level. This chapter contains another case-within-a-case, the 1979 Hostage Crisis
when Iranian students storm the US embassy in Teheran and take more than sixty hostages.
Chapter 9: Reagan & Economic Freedom. In Ronald Reagan's closing statement during the
1980 presidential debate, he asks a question. Are you better off than you were four years ago?
This question is highly effective but not particularly original. Reagan is imitating Franklin
Roosevelt who asks the same question during the Great Depression. When Reagan gives his first
major foreign policy address (in October 1981) he continues to draw inspiration from Roosevelt,
who says political freedom without economic freedom is meaningless. For the rest of Reagan's
presidency, his foreign policy is a convergence of themes such as strategic defense, arms control,
and the concept of economic freedom.
Chapter 10: Beyond the Cold War. In the early years after the Cold War, George Bush and Bill
Clinton try to make sense of the new era. Bush uses a simplistic slogan—beyond containment—
which is mostly a list of rules Russia must obey to reintegrate (or rejoin) the new world order.
These rules of international behavior—which go back to Eisenhower and Nixon—are unwritten
and well-known but often ignored. Now that the Cold War is over, both Bush and Clinton are
worried the US will withdraw from the world and retreat into protectionism and isolationism.
Chapter 11: Bush & Homeland Security. In November 2001, barely two months after the 9/11
attack, George W. Bush gives a national address. The symbolic meaning in his remarks is clear
from the subtext: burning buildings, innocent lives, unimaginable horror, and so many funerals.
All of which means one thing: our lives will never be the same. This case highlights the unusual
challenge of simultaneously producing and executing a national strategy while the emergency
response is ongoing. Dozens of federal agencies are already mobilized, as well as state and local
governments, and many international organizations. And a new cabinet-level position is created:
Director of (later Secretary of) Homeland Security, whose assignment is to develop a national
strategy for homeland security.
Chapter 12: Obama's Campaign Promise. In October 2002, Illinois State Senator Barack
Obama gives a speech to oppose the use of force against Iraq. Five years later, Obama announces
he's running for president and promises to end the war. Obama even quotes his own antiwar speech five years ago when he predicts an occupation of undetermined length, undetermined
costs, and undetermined consequences. This campaign promise is relevant to our inquiry because
it shows the difference between the candidate and the commander-in-chief. And it shows that
campaign promises are no substitute for structured analysis, which represents the first element of
critical thinking.
Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
