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Full Description
The scholarly inquiry of the causes of Austrias defeat in 1866 is almost as
old as the war against rising Prussia itself. Already in the immediate
aftermath of the conflict, considerable energy was devoted to identifying the
sources of failure. At the time, responsibility was attributed to the
misjudgements of the high command, and above all to the commander-in-chief of
the k.k. North Army, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek. This one-sided
interpretation, together with the broader debate surrounding the so-called
question of guilt (Schuldfrage), was later treated with increasing nuance.
During the twentieth century, historians sought the origins of the defeat at
both political and military levels. From a military perspective, research has
primarily examined developments in armaments technology, the (strategic-)
operational miscalculations of the campaign, and the structural deficiencies of
the k.k. Army, which stemmed in large part from severe budgetary restrictions.
By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to battle tactics.
In 1866, Austria entered the war against Prussia with a tactical doctrine
nearly sixty years old, based on an overestimation of the historical tradition
of military values.
This volume examines precisely this neglected aspect. Within the broader
context of armed conflicts since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars against
France, it introduces and systematically analyses Austrian military doctrine,
with particular emphasis on tactics. The study critically examines the outdated
systems of recruitment and training, while also considering the related fields
of uniforms and equipment, soldiers daily life, and military communication. The
investigation, however, focuses primarily on two main themes: first, the
Austrians disdain for the employment of firearms; and second, their unshakeable
belief in the invincibility of their own close-order battle formations. The
bayonet charge, in particular, was accorded a special and almost emblematic
status. The volume further explores the interaction between the various arms in
wartime and highlights the complex interrelationship between strategic and
tactical concepts. It becomes clear that the k.k. Austrian Army was among the
very last of the truly Napoleonic forces; an army whose admirable courage could
no longer compensate for hopelessly outdated infantry tactics in the age of
industrialised warfare.
Contents
Foreword
Introduction
State of research
The army
The Austrian army spirit
Impact of the financial crisis
The clash of arms
The long road to war an overview
The Schleswig-Holstein Question 1863-1865
Mobilisation and deployment
The war begins
All quiet in the south
The invasion of Bohemia
The North Army in crisis
Königgrätz
Retreat to Olmütz
Formation of the k.k. Danube Army
Conclusion of peace
Forgotten fronts: Tyrol and the Main Campaign
The theatre of war
The terrain
Fortified defensive positions and entrenchments
The tactical level
General considerations
Army organisation
Conscription and length of service
Drill manuals
The firefight
Hurrah and charge the Austrian shock tactics
Morale, discipline and panic
Transport, march, and rations
Uniform and equipment of the soldier
Colours
Cooperation between the branches
Excursus: The strategic level
Theoretical starting point
The operational plans in 1866
Command and control
Intelligence
Summary
Answering the research questions
Recap and outlook
Concluding words
List of sources and references
Picture credits
Index of places and persons
