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In consequence of an increased interest in problems relating to human action, normative concepts have been much discussed by philosophers and logicians in the past twenty years. Deontic logic, which deals with the normative use of language and such normative concepts as obligation, prohibition and permission, has become one of the most intensively cultivated areas of formal logic. Important investigations have been carried out which have shed considerable light on various aspects of the normative phenomenon and a great number of different systems of deontic logic have been developed. This progressive proliferation of deontic logics not only shows the great interest of logicians in normative discourse, but also reflects a basic perplexity: the lack of suitable criteria of adequacy for the interpretation of deontic calculi and hence difficulty in decid ing which of the systems provides the best reconstruction of the underlying normative concepts and can therefore be applied with the most fruitful results. This difficulty is so great that some authors have even expressed doubts about the practical usefulness of deontic logic. One of the sources of this perplexity lies in the absence of a well established pre-analytical basis for formal studies. It is sometimes even uncertain what the intuitive notions are that deontic logicians intend to reconstruct. In talking about obligations, prohibitions and permissions, they usually have in mind moral norms. But the choice of moral norm as an explicandum for the construction of a logic of norms has several disadvantages.
(Table of content)
I: The Logic of Normative Systems.- I. A Model for Normative Systems.- 1. Methodological Considerations.- 2. A Normative Problem.- 3. The Factual Range of the Problem.- 4. The Normative Range of the Problem.- 5. Reconstruction of a Normative System.- 6. Variations of the Model.- II. The Concept of Case.- 1. The Elements of the Universe of Properties and their Internal Relations.- 2. The Universe of Cases.- 3. Generic and Individual Cases.- 4. Problems of Application: Gaps of Knowledge and Gaps of Recognition.- III. The Concept of Solution.- 1. Elements of the UA and their Internal Relations.- 2. Deontic Contents.- 3. Deontic Sentences and Solutions.- 4. Maximal and Minimal Solutions.- 5. Solutions and Norms.- IV. The Concept of Normative System.- 1. Aristotle's Theory of Science and its Influence.- 2. Modern Conception of Science and the Notion of System.- 3. The Concept of System in Legal Science.- 4. Definition of Normative System.- 5. Comments on the Definition of Normative System.- 6. Formal Properties of Normative Systems.- II: Some Problems of Legal Theory.- V. Problems of Systematization in Legal Science.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Legal Science and the Systematization of the Law.- 3. Identification of the Basis and the Problem of Legal Validity.- 4. Reformulation of the System and the Genesis of General Principles of Law.- 5. "Juristic Induction".- 6. Creative Function of Legal Science.- 7. Changes in a System.- 8. Changes in Interpretation.- VI. The Problem of Relevance and Axiological Gaps.- 1. Universes of Cases of Different Level.- 2. Completeness of a System and the Problem of Relevance.- 3. Relevant and Irrelevant Properties.- 4. The Thesis and the Hypothesis of Relevance.- 5. Axiological Gaps.- 6. Axiological Gaps in Legal Theory.- VII. The Problem of Closure.- 1. Closed and Open Systems.- 2. Closure Based of the Interdefinability of "Permitted" and "Prohibited".- 3. Analysis of the Principle of Prohibition.- 4. The Postulate of the Necessary Completeness of the Law.- 5. Analysis of the Postulate of Completeness.- 6. Rules of Closure.- 7. The Rule "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege".- VIII. Judicial Decisions and the Problem of Legal Gaps.- 1. The Function of Jurisdiction.- 2. Judicial Decision.- 3. The Secondary System.- 4. The Justification of the Decision.- 5. The Situation of the Judge in the Case of a Normative Gap.- 6. Can the Judge Resolve a Case where there is a Normative Gap without Modifying the Law?.- 7. Argumentum e contrario.- IX. Completeness as a Rational Ideal.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Ideal of Normative Completeness.- 3. Normative Justification.- 4. The Requirement of Completeness as a Rational Ideal.- 5. Its Scope and Limits.- 6. A Rationalist Illusion.- 7. The Ideological Function of the Postulate of Completeness.- Appendix: Some Definitions and Theorems.
