Full Description
This book
constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 11th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, held in Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, in December 2015. The 30 regular papers presented together with 8
abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 142 submissions and cover
results on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science,
artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
Contents
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.- Price
Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare.- Computing
Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing.- The
(Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments.- Fast
Convergence in the Double Oral Auction.- Minority Becomes Majority in Social
Networks.- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem.-
Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators.- Computing Approximate Nash
Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost
Functions.- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games.- Impartial
Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.- Online Allocation and Pricing
with Economies of Scale.- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms.- Testing
Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs.- Computation of
Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.- Welfare and Rationality
Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.- Combinatorial
Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities.- Applications of α-strongly Regular
Distributions to Bayesian Auctions.- The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing
Games.- Adaptive Rumor Spreading.- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection
for Aggregative Games.- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling
Equilibrium.- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery
in CP-nets.- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players.- The VCG Mechanism
for Bayesian Scheduling.- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of
Money.- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands.- Mechanisms with Monitoring
for Truthful RAM Allocation.- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in
Succinct Games.- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.
