- ホーム
- > 洋書
- > 英文書
- > Computer / General
Full Description
Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Contents
Introductory Remarks.- A Classical Cooperative Theory.- Cooperative Theory of Bargaining I: Classical.- Cooperative Theory of Bargaining II: Modern Development.- Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts.- Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts.- Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information.- B Non-Cooperative Approaches.- Bargaining Games.- Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core.- Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information.- Coalitional Non-Cooperative Approaches to Cooperation.- Situation Approach to Cooperation.- C Dynamic Models.- Cooperation Through Repetition: Complete Information.- Communication, Correlation and Cooperation.- Rationality and Bounded Rationality.- Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata.- Learning in Games: Fictitious Play Dynamics.- Evolution and Games: Replicator Dynamics.- D Descriptive Theory.- Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation.
