Description
(Text)
The analysis of tax evasion in Russia sheds some light on its development in the transitional period and the developing economies. Countries which suffer corruption and extortion show a higher level of tax evasion, so that these bad government practices seem to be partly responsible for tax evasion. Employing game theoretical modelling this book explores the influence of extortionist government on corporate tax evasion. In comparison to standard models on tax evasion in this setting the effect of tax policy instruments such as penalties and probability of investigation is alleviated due to bad government's existence. Some policy implications are proposed in this respect.
(Table of content)
Contents: Analysis of tax evasion in Russia - Models on tax evasion - Firms' and governments' games - Extortionist governments - Policy implications.
(Author portrait)
The Author: Julia Kupzowa, born in 1978 in Moscow, studied international economics and public finance from 1995 to 2000 in Moscow. From 2003 to 2006 she was a Ph.D. student at the chair of public finance of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.
