耐久消費財の環境・資源政策<br>Environmental and Resource Policy for Consumer Durables (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Vol.534) (2004. X, 197 p. w. 5 ill.)

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耐久消費財の環境・資源政策
Environmental and Resource Policy for Consumer Durables (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Vol.534) (2004. X, 197 p. w. 5 ill.)

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Description


(Text)
A recent line of research in environmental and resource economics deals with the analysis of the so-called product-related environmental policy, i.e. the regulation of certain product characteristics which are mainly determined by producers and which influence the impact of consumption goods on the environment. In this line of literature, only little attention has been paid to the role of product durability. The present study aims at filling this gap. It investigates the relationship between (built-in) product durability, production emissions, solid consumption waste and recycling. The main task is to identify inefficiencies in the durability choice of producers and to assess regulatory policies which aim at correcting for such market failure. TOC:Introduction.- Definitions, Assumptions and Basic Model.- Regulating Production Emissions of Consumer Durables.- Regulating Solid Waste of Consumer Durables.- Recycling Policies for Consumer Durables.- Conclusion.- References.
(Table of content)
1 Introduction.- 2 Definitions, Assumptions and Basic Model.- 2.1 Modeling Consumer Durables.- 2.1.1 Durable versus Nondurable Goods.- 2.1.2 Decay function of Consumer Durables.- 2.1.3 Vintage Durable Goods.- 2.2 Basic Oligopoly Model without Pollution.- 2.2.1 Model Description and Market Equilibrium.- 2.2.2 Stationary State.- 2.2.3 Comparative Statics of the Long Run Market Equilibrium.- 3 Regulating Production Emissions of Consumer Durables.- 3.1 The Model of Goering and Boyce (1999).- 3.1.1 Model Descriptionand Market Equilibrium.- 3.1.2 Market Equilibrium Revised.- 3.1.3 Second-Best Emissions Taxation.- 3.1.4 Second-Best Emissions Taxation Revised.- 3.2 Modified Model with Production Emissions.- 3.2.1 Model Description and First-Best Welfare Optimum.- 3.2.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire.- 3.2.3 First-Best Regulation.- 3.2.4 Second-Best Taxation.- 3.3 Practicability of Durable Goods Regulation.- 4 Regulating Solid Waste of Consumer Durables.- 4.1 Durable Goods Markets with Commitment Ability of Producers.- 4.1.1 Model and Social Welfare Optimum.- 4.1.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire.- 4.1.3 First-Best Regulation.- 4.1.4 Second-Best Taxation.- 4.2 Durable Goods Markets without Commitment Ability of Producers.- 4.2.1 Model and Social Welfare Optimum.- 4.2.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire.- 4.2.3 First-Best Regulation.- 4.2.4 Second-Best Taxation.- 4.3 Implications for Practical Waste Policy.- 5 Recycling Policies for Consumer Durables.- 5.1 Durable Goods Markets with Exogenous Product Durability.- 5.1.1 Model and Efficient Allocation.- 5.1.2 Benchmark Market System.- 5.1.3 Market Failure and its Correction.- 5.2 Durable Goods Markets with Endogenous Product Durability.- 5.2.1 Model and Efficient Allocation.- 5.2.2 Benchmark Market System.- 5.2.3 Market Failure and its Correction.- 5.3 Summary and Practical Considerations.- 6 Conclusion.- References.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction                                     1  (10)
2 Definitions, Assumptions and Basic Model 11 (36)
2.1 Modeling Consumer Durables 11 (12)
2.1.1 Durable versus Nondurable Goods 11 (2)
2.1.2 Decay Function of Consumer Durables 13 (10)
2.1.3 Vintage Durable Goods 23 (1)
2.2 Basic Oligopoly Model without Pollution 23 (24)
2.2.1 Model Description and Market 23 (12)
Equilibrium
2.2.2 Stationary State 35 (7)
2.2.3 Comparative Statics of the Long Run 42 (5)
Market Equilibrium
3 Regulating Production Emissions of Consumer 47 (40)
Durables
3.1 The Model of Goering and Boyce (1999) 48 (19)
3.1.1 Model Description and Market 48 (6)
Equilibrium
3.1.2 Market Equilibrium Revised 54 (3)
3.1.3 Second-Best Emissions Taxation 57 (3)
3.1.4 Second-Best Emissions Taxation Revised 60 (7)
3.2 Modified Model with Production Emissions 67 (16)
3.2.1 Model Description and First-Best 67 (4)
Welfare Optimum
3.2.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire 71 (7)
3.2.3 First-Best Regulation 78 (3)
3.2.4 Second-Best Taxation 81 (2)
3.3 Practicability of Durable Goods Regulation 83 (4)
4 Regulating Solid Waste of Consumer Durables 87 (52)
4.1 Durable Goods Markets with Commitment 88 (18)
Ability of Producers
4.1.1 Model and Social Welfare Optimum 88 (7)
4.1.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire 95 (6)
4.1.3 First-Best Regulation 101(3)
4.1.4 Second-Best Taxation 104(2)
4.2 Durable Goods Markets without Commitment 106(26)
Ability of Producers
4.2.1 Model and Social Welfare Optimum 106(4)
4.2.2 Market Equilibrium and Laissez Faire 110(11)
4.2.3 First-Best Regulation 121(4)
4.2.4 Second-Best Taxation 125(7)
4.3 Implications for Practical Waste Policy 132(7)
5 Recycling Policies for Consumer Durables 139(46)
5.1 Durable Goods Markets with Exogenous 140(16)
Product Durability
5.1.1 Model and Efficient Allocation 140(9)
5.1.2 Benchmark Market System 149(5)
5.1.3 Market Failure and its Correction 154(2)
5.2 Durable Goods Markets with Endogenous 156(24)
Product Durability
5.2.1 Model and Efficient Allocation 156(11)
5.2.2 Benchmark Market System 167(5)
5.2.3 Market Failure and its Correction 172(8)
5.3 Summary and Practical Considerations 180(5)
6 Conclusion 185(4)
References 189(6)
List of Figures 195(2)
List of Tables 197