Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes (Springerbriefs in Economics)

Felsenthal, Dan S./ Nurmi, Hannu

Springer International Publishing AG（2018/01発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 134 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9783319740324
• DDC分類 302.1

Full Description

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

Contents

Introduction.- Voting Paradoxes.- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate.- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes.- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes.- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes.- Summary.