Description
This project argues that arguments for the permissibility of killing specifically, arguments in favor of abortion and euthanasia fail to justify their conclusions. At best, these arguments form a merely coherent network, but ultimately evince a circular pattern of justification. This book traces the two principal arguments made in support of permissible abortion: arguments based on a time-relative interest account of wrongdoing; and arguments based on the non-personhood of what is killed. It also addresses the principal arguments made in support of permissible euthanasia, namely arguments based on the value of autonomy and compassion. For each argument, this book argues that it suffers from various defects. The book thus concludes that arguments for abortion and euthanasia are unjustified.
Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. De jure defects.- Chapter 3. Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.- Chapter 4. Psychological accounts of the person and the defense of (pk).- Chapter 5. The Modal Argument against Abortion.- Chapter 6. Euthanasia, Suffering, and the Intention to Kill.- Chapter 7. Euthanasia, suffering, and care.- Chapter 8. Moral risk.
Stephen Napier is Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University, specializing in clinical bioethics and epistemology. He was a post-doctoral fellow in clinical and research ethics for two years in a tertiary care center, after which he held a full-time position with an IRB specializing in the review of pediatric research. He has published two monographs: Virtue epistemology: Motivation and knowledge (2008), and more recently, Uncertain Bioethics: Moral Risk and Human Dignity (2020).
