Voting Procedures under a Restricted Domain : An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes (Springerbriefs in Economics) （2019）

Felsenthal, Dan S./ Nurmi, Hannu

Springer Nature Switzerland AG（2019/04発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 92 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9783030126261
• DDC分類 324.65

Full Description

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

Contents

Introduction.- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain.- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain.- Summary.