法、非公式規制と経済実績 Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance : The Case for Common Law

法、非公式規制と経済実績<br>Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance : The Case for Common Law

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法、非公式規制と経済実績
Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance : The Case for Common Law

Pejovich, Svetozar/ Colombatto, Enrico

ウェブストア価格 ¥28,765（本体¥26,150）
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd（2008/06発売）
外貨定価 UK£ 94.00
ポイント 261pt

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製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 192 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9781845428730
DDC分類 340.11

基本説明

New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 2008. Makes the case that a major reason for the success of capitalism lies in the efficiency-friendly incentives of its basic institutions, which continuously adjust the rules of the game to the requirements of economic progress.

Full Description

Capitalism has outperformed all other systems and maintained a positive growth rate since it began. Svetozar Pejovich makes the case within this book that a major reason for the success of capitalism lies in the efficiency-friendly incentives of its basic institutions, which continuously adjust the rules of the game to the requirements of economic progress. The analysis throughout is consistent and is supported by evidence. Key components of the proposed theory are the rule of law, the market for institutions, the interaction thesis, the carriers of change, and the process of changing formal and informal institutions.This book will be of great interest to academics and students of law and economics, new institutional economics, comparative systems and public choice throughout the world and especially in East Asia and South America where institutional issues are being debated.

Contents:

Foreword by Leonard P. Liggio

Preface and Acknowledgments

PART I: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
1. The Game and the Rules of the Game

2. Transaction Costs

PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY INTO MODERN SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE RULE OF LAW AND CAPITALISM
3. From the Middle Ages to Capitalism

4. Capitalism and the Rule of Law
Appendix: Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideraturm
James M. Buchanan

5. The Law of Contract and the Judiciary

6. The Economic Functions of the Constitution

7. Private Property Rights

8. Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Performance

9. The Rule of Law and Capitalism: An Overview

PART III: TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
10. The Method of Analysis

11. The Interaction Thesis

12. The Carriers of Change: The Role of Entrepreneurs

13. Formal Institutions

14. Informal Institutions or Cultural Traditions: The Role of Pathfinders

15. Efficiency-Friendly Institutional Change within the Structure of Tradition

Index