汚職の経済学：国際ハンドブック International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption

Rose-Ackerman, Susan (EDT)

Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd（2006/10発売）

• 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 656 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9781845422424
• DDC分類 364.1323

基本説明

New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 2006. Part I: Corruption and poor governance around the world. Part II: Corruption and institutional structure. Part III: Corruption in the transition from socialism. Part IV: Surveys and experiments. Part V: Sectoral anti-corruption policies.

Full Description

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research. The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.

Contents

Contents:

Introduction and Overview
Susan Rose-Ackerman

PART I: CORRUPTION AND POOR GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD
1. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?
Johann Graf Lambsdorff

2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi

3. Measuring Institutions
Christopher Woodruff

PART II: CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
4. Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions
Ray Fisman and Roberta Gatti

5. Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics
Jana Kunicová

6. Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability
Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee

7. Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic Structure
Ajit Mishra

8. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis
Mushtaq H. Khan

PART III: CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM
9. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Countries
Alan Rousso and Franklin Steves

10. Corruption in China and Russia Compared: Different Legacies of Central Planning
Jens Andvig

PART IV: SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS
11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?
Jennifer Hunt

12. Corruption and the Demand for Regulating Capitalists
Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch

13. Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of Norwegian Firms
Tina Søreide

14. Laboratory Experiments on Corruption
Klaus Abbink

PART V: SECTORAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES
15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About It
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson

16. Corruption and the Management of Public Works in Italy
Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci

17. Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad

18. The Economics of Anti-Corruption: Lessons from a Widespread Customs Reform
Dean Yang

19. Prescription for Abuse? Pharmaceutical Selection in Bulgarian Healthcare
Patrick Meagher

Index