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Full Description
Inspired by F.A. Hayek's Individualism and Economic Order, this book, edited by Yong Yoon, stands in contrast to the themes of that work by emphasizing that collective action operates differently from the way the market works. The chapters comprise papers written by James M. Buchanan, both with and without Yoon's co-authorship, after the publication of his Collected Works.
In this book, the authors analyze political disorder that is caused by individualism and self-interest in democracy, focusing specifically on the American political commons. Buchanan and Yoon expertly examine a variety of topics within this theme: the public choice approach to political disorder, rigorous economic models, the dysfunction of American fiscal institutions, the psychological aspects of political rules, and Fukuyama's vetocracy as a case of anti-commons.
Readers will gain many new insights from Individualism and Political Disorder, and it will prove invaluable for academics and students in an array of areas, such as economics, politics, public policy and public administration, social psychology, and law and economics.
Contents
Contents: Foreword Roger Congleton PART I INTRODUCTION Introduction: Political Disorder and Decay PART II ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 1. Majoritarian Logic 2. Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules 3. The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules (Buchanan and Yoon) 4. Variations on Tullock's Road Model 5. Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anti-commons 6. Majoritarian Management of the Commons 7. Universalism through common access: an alternative model of distributive politics 8. Majoritarian Exploitation of Fiscal Commons: General Taxes -Differential Transfers 9. All Voting is Strategic 10. Public Choice and the Extent of the Market 11. Choosing for Others: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Collective Action 12. The Cost of Collectivization, Per Se PART III: AMERICA'S FISCAL TRAGEDY 13. Institutional Sources of American Fiscal Tragedy Index
