Full Description
"War is too important to be left to the generals," declared French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau over a century ago. But which civilians, exactly, play the most important roles in controlling the armed forces? When civilian control is studied, the focus is typically on those in the upper echelons of the executive branch: presidents, prime ministers, or defense secretaries. Yet, because civilians in the executive may be tempted to hide problems or use the military in controversial ways, researchers must extend Clemenceau's dictum: if war is too important to be left to the generals, civilian control is too important to leave with the executive. This book aims to understand the similarities and differences among the world's democracies regarding the role of legislatures in democratic civil-military relations. Drawing on over a dozen cases from across the globe, the authors examine how most legislatures face capability and motivational impediments to conducting truly robust oversight and propose realistic reforms to strengthen military accountability to elected officials and the public—the heart of the civil-military relationship.
