The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism : Neuroethics and Seeming States

Dabbagh, Hossein

Bloomsbury Academic（2024/06発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 264 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9781350297616
• DDC分類 171.2

Full Description

Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.

His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: Mind

1. Philosophical Intuition's Mental Ontology

2. Moral Intuition's Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition

3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence

Part II: Epistemology

4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard's and W. D. Ross's Ideas

5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism

Part III: Neuroethics

6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists' Position

7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong's Position

Afterword

Notes
Bibliography
Index