Full Description
This title was first published in 2000: Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.
Contents
Acknowledgements, Series Preface, Introduction, PART I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THEORY, 1. 'The Problem of Global Environmental Protection', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6, pp. 68-79, 2. 'Global Environmental Problems: The Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by One Country', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, pp. 55-70, 3. 'Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the "Greenhouse Effect" ', Economica, 60, pp. 281-93, 4. 'Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment', Journal o f Public Economics, 52, pp. 309-28, 5. 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements', Oxford Economic Papers, 46, pp. 878-94, 6. 'Environmental Consciousness and Moral Hazard in International Agreements to Protect the Environment', Journal of Public Economics, 60, pp. 95-110, 7. 'Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, pp. 170-88, 8. 'The Effects of Collusion and Limited Liability on the Design of International Environmental Agreements for Developing Countries', Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 1-25, PART II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: APPLICATIONS, 9. 'Political Institutions and Pollution Control', Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, pp. 412-21, 10. 'Efficiency and Distribution in Greenhouse Negotiations', Kyklos, 46, pp. 363-97, 11. 'A Finnish-Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24, pp. 87-99, 12. 'Voluntary Provision of a Public Good: Results from a Real World Experiment', Kyklos, 47, pp. 505-18, 13. 'The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol', Journal of Public Economics, 63, pp. 331-49, 14.'A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe', Economica, 64, pp. 281-301, Name Index
