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Full Description
What does it take for warnings about violent conflict and war to be listened to, believed and acted upon? Why are warnings from some sources noticed and largely accepted, while others are ignored or disbelieved? These questions are central to considering the feasibility of preventing harm to the economic and security interests of states. Challenging conventional accounts that tend to blame decision-makers' lack of receptivity and political will, the authors offer a new theoretical framework explaining how distinct 'paths of persuasion' are shaped by a select number of factors, including conflict characteristics, political contexts, and source-recipient relations. This is the first study to systematically integrate persuasion attempts by analysts, diplomats and senior officials with those by journalists and NGO staff. Its ambitious comparative design encompasses three states (the US, UK, and Germany) and international organisations (the UN, EU, and OSCE) and looks in depth at four conflict cases: Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014).
Contents
1. Conflict warnings as persuasion attempts; 2. A theory of conflict warning as persuasion in foreign policy; 3. Inside-up warnings within states and international organisations; 4. Outside-in warnings I: persuasion by NGOs; 5. Outside-in warnings II: persuasion by journalists and media organisations; 6. (Mis-)identifying warnings and the problem of hindsight bias: the case of the Rwandan Genocide; 7. What makes individual officials persuasive warners? The case of the 2004 Darfur crisis; 8. Explaining differences in persuasiveness: the EU members states and the 2008 Five-Day War in Georgia; 9. Warning within EU institutions and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2013-14; 10. When are warnings heeded and what can warners do?; References; Index.
