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基本説明
Why do states issue ultimatums they expect will be rejected? This book introduces the concept of 'insincere coercion', showing how anticipated – and sometimes intentional – failure can advance foreign policy goals. Drawing on cases from the Falklands, Iraq, and Lebanon, it is essential reading on international security and military strategy.
Full Description
Statecraft often appears irrational. Why do states issue ultimatums they anticipate will be rejected? Expecting to Fail resolves this puzzle by introducing the concept of 'insincere coercion' - a strategic process whereby states adopt coercive strategies not to reach compromise, but as an instrumental means of achieving broader foreign policy goals through brute force. Utilizing a militarized conflict model and an original Coercion in Interstate Militarized Conflict (CIMC) dataset, this book demonstrates that insincere coercion is a rational tool used to mobilize international and domestic support, make examples of targets, or restore deterrence. Featuring detailed case studies of the Falklands War, the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Second Lebanon War, Phil Haun offers a thoughtful reconsideration of the relationship between threats and brute force. Essential for scholars and practitioners alike, this work exposes the 'tragic utility of violence' in an uncertain international landscape.
Contents
Introduction; 1. Insincere coercion; 2. Coercion in interstate militarized conflict (CIMC); 3. The Falklands war; 4. The Gulf war; 5. Interwar Iraq; 6. The Iraq War; 7. The second Lebanon war and restoring deterrence; Conclusion; Appendix A. Militarized conflict and deterrence models; Appendix B. CIMC case selection criteria; Appendix C. Summaries of CIMC cases; Index.



