Full Description
This book examines how continental great powers have attempted to develop and wield strong navies since 1801.
Continental Powers and Naval Development argues that a continental great power's ability to build and effectively use a strong navy is greatly affected by two factors: a naval force design capable of executing national strategy (strategy coherence) and the deployment of that navy to places or for purposes that minimize the dominant naval power's threat perception (threat diffusion). Each factor is deceptively difficult for a continental great power to achieve but, through an analysis of four historical case studies, this book shows how both factors are vital not just for successful naval development, but for keeping the peace among great powers. Finally, it highlights how states commonly thought of as "unnatural" naval powers can nonetheless achieve their political objectives at sea.
This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, maritime strategy, and International Relations.
Contents
1. Introduction 2. On Continental Great-Power Naval Development 3. A Brilliant Second: France's Experience with Naval Development 4. Too Large to Die Gloriously: Germany's Experience with Naval Development 5. An Artificial Imposition: Imperial Russia's Experience with Naval Development 6. Luxuries Should Not Be Permitted: The Soviet Union's Experience with Naval Development 7. A New, Historic Mission: China's Experience with Naval Development 8. Conclusion
