フレーゲの謎：なぜ命題は心的態度の対象ではないのか On Frege Puzzles : Why Propositions Are Not the Objects of Our Mental Attitudes (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

ホーム
> 洋書
> 英文書
> Language

フレーゲの謎：なぜ命題は心的態度の対象ではないのか<br>On Frege Puzzles : Why Propositions Are Not the Objects of Our Mental Attitudes (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

個数：

フレーゲの謎：なぜ命題は心的態度の対象ではないのか
On Frege Puzzles : Why Propositions Are Not the Objects of Our Mental Attitudes (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

Rinner, Stefan

ウェブストア価格 ¥45,056（本体¥40,960）
Routledge（2025/07発売）
外貨定価 US$ 200.00
ポイント 409pt

提携先の海外書籍取次会社に在庫がございます。通常3週間で発送いたします。
【重要ご説明事項】
1. 納期遅延や、ご入手不能となる場合が若干ございます。
2. 複数冊ご注文の場合は、ご注文数量が揃ってからまとめて発送いたします。
3. 美品のご指定は承りかねます。

●3Dセキュア導入とクレジットカードによるお支払いについて

【入荷遅延について】
世界情勢の影響により、海外からお取り寄せとなる洋書・洋古書の入荷が、表示している標準的な納期よりも遅延する場合がございます。
おそれいりますが、あらかじめご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。

◆画像の表紙や帯等は実物とは異なる場合があります。

◆ウェブストアでの洋書販売価格は、弊社店舗等での販売価格とは異なります。
また、洋書販売価格は、ご注文確定時点での日本円価格となります。
ご注文確定後に、同じ洋書の販売価格が変動しても、それは反映されません。

製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 212 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9781032957524
DDC分類 401

Full Description

This book argues against the received view of propositional theory, according to which mental attitudes—such as believing, knowing, hoping, and wishing—are relations held between agents and propositions.

Roughly speaking, propositions are primary bearers of truth that are neither sentences nor utterances of sentences, be it of a public language or of a language of thought. This book argues that the propositional theory does not provide a solution to Frege's puzzle about belief, which arises if we formulate disquotational principles connecting sincere assertion and belief, certain standards regarding rationality, and semantic principles such as the theory of direct reference within the framework of the propositional theory. This suggests that we must reject the propositional theory. The book emphasises this again by showing that the propositional theory cannot solve Schiffer's puzzle regarding de re belief, which, in addition to disquotational principles connecting sincere assertion and belief, uses highly plausible exportation and rationality principles for de re belief. It then discusses possible alternatives to the propositional theory, such as Marcus' theory of states of affairs, Lewis' property account, Larson and Ludlow's theory of interpreted logical forms, and Moltmann's Multiple Relation Theory. Just like the propositional theory, these theories maintain that mental attitudes such as believing are relations, and they also inherit the main problems of the propositional theory. Therefore, the author proposes and develops a non-relational account of the attitudes in question that together with a measurement account of the respective attitude ascriptions, provides a solution to both Frege's puzzle and Schiffer's puzzle.

On Frege Puzzles will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and logic.

Introduction 1. Frege's Puzzle 2. Frege Puzzles for Fregeans 3 Frege Puzzles for Russellians 4. Propositionalism and Schiffer's Puzzle 5. Rejecting Relationalism