Full Description
This book provides the European structure of liability for failed contract negotiations through a comparative lens, with wider lessons for an international context.
The book demonstrates that all the analyzed legal systems, in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, can be best understood through a binary structure in their approach to pre-contractual liability, or culpa in contrahendo. This structure consists of two key elements: first, a general liability framework that allows for compensation of pure economic loss based on certain qualified conduct, such as negligence; and second, an implicit obligation to contract, which, though not explicitly recognized, is presumed in most systems. The book argues that this dual framework provides valuable insights into ongoing scholarly debates and the challenges practitioners face in cases of failed contract negotiations. Drawing on these insights, it proposes a more effective approach to the obligation to contract: one that encourages parties to collaborate in reaching an agreement voluntarily rather than imposing one upon them.
This book will be of interest to researchers in the field of comparative contract and tort law, European private law, and private law theory.
Contents
Introduction
Part I: Structure Of Liability for Contract Negotiations and Obligations to Contract
1. Function of Pre-Contractual Liability
2. Structure of Pre-Contractual Liability
Part II: Liability for Contract Negotiations
3. Structure and Functionning of Liability for Contract Negotiations
4. Sanctions
5. Findings
Part III: Obligation to Negotiate or to Contract
6. Circumventing Causal Uncertainty
7. The Obligation to Negotiate or to Contract
8. Alternative: Obliegenheit to Contract
9. Summary
Conclusion
