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Full Description
Western Intervention in the Middle East and North Africa: The 'Responsibility to Protect' in Libya, Syria and Beyond offers a groundbreaking investigation into one of the most contested questions in international relations: why states intervene to stop mass atrocities in some contexts but not in others.
Focusing on the United States and the United Kingdom, this book examines two pivotal cases - Libya (2011) and Syria (2011-2013) - to reveal how decisions under the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are shaped less by universal norms than by nationally constructed identities and interests. Through detailed case studies, qualitative interviews, and extensive engagement with social constructivist theory, the book demonstrates how the U.S. and U.K. positioned themselves as 'intervener' in Libya but as 'non-intervener' in Syria, and how the Libya experience itself influenced subsequent restraint in Syria. By tracing the complex interaction of social, political, and institutional factors, it challenges the assumption that R2P operates as a purely international agenda and instead uncovers the national-level dynamics that determine whether and how military interventions occur.
Essential reading for scholars, policy makers, and practitioners in international relations, human rights, and Middle East and North African studies, this book provides critical insights into the politics of atrocity prevention and highlights the nuanced conditions required for future third pillar responses.
Contents
CONTENTS
1 Introduction
I. Introduction
The Question and the Argument
II. An Old Problem in a New Context
The R2P Norm: Establishment and Advancement
III. Analytic Framework
Constructivism: Social Realities of International Relations
Constructivism and R2P in Research
The Concept of 'Intervener Identity'
IV. Methodology
Case Study Selection and Justification: Why Libya and Syria?
Data Generation
Successes, Challenges, and Limitations
V. Book Structure
2 Libya and Syria - Background: Instability, Tensions, and Abuses
I. Introduction
II. Libya
Instability of the State
The Role of Outside Powers
Human Rights Abuses
The Arab Spring Arrives in Libya
III. Syria
Instability of the State
The Role of Outside Powers
Human Rights Abuses
The Arab Spring Arrives in Syria
IV. Conclusion
3 Libya - R2P in Perception (Pre-Intervention): History, Knowledge, and Influences
I. Introduction
II. U.S. and U.K. Actor Perceptions of R2P
The Need for R2P: Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo
The Road to R2P: Advocacy and Engagement
R2P as a Humanitarian Concept: Unfamiliarity and Unawareness
R2P Implementation: Actor Ideas About Best Practices
III. Situating R2P Strategies in Context
The U.S., the U.K., and Libya: Missing Links
The 'Benghazi Moment': Accelerating the Response
U.N. Security Council Membership: Gatekeepers for R2P
IV. National Interests, Responsibilities, and Limitations
No Common Cause: Widening the National Interest
The Resources Problem: Priorities and Deficiencies
The Pressure Builds: Decision Points and R2P
V. Conclusion
4 Libya - R2P in Practice (Intervention): Applications, Problems, and Adjustments
I. Introduction
II. The Early Stage: An Intervention Dilemma
From Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) to Operation Unified Protector (OUP): No Simple Way
Undertaking Third Pillar Intervention: The Problem of Who
NATO Clears the Threshold: Transitioning, Shadowing, and Advancing
III. The Mid/Late Stages: Hard Realities of Intervention
NATO's First Battle: Making the System Work
Shaping R2P: Language, Meanings, and Standards
OUP Intensifies: NATO's Challenges and Problems
OUP in Paralysis: The Intentions and 'The Activities'
OUP Concludes: Shutting It Down
IV. Conclusion
5 Libya - R2P in Reflection (Post-Intervention): Learning, Evaluation, and Deliberation
I. Introduction
II. OUP's Successes and Accomplishments
III. OUP's Failings and Lessons
IV. The Post-OUP Clash of Visions
6 Syria - R2P Misplaced: Wariness, Polarization, and Prohibitiveness
I. Introduction
II. Effecting Non-Intervention: Misconceptions, Overlearning, and the Escalation Dynamic
III. Horrific Yet Insufficient: The Shabbiha, Homs, and Ghouta
IV. U.N. Security Council Dynamics: Clashes of Interests
V. Contemplating Militarized Intervention: What It Would Take
VI. Conclusion
6 Conclusion and the Way Forward
References
Appendix I: Text of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) Norm
Appendix II: Personal Interviews with the Author
Appendix III: List of Abbreviations
Index



