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Full Description
First published in 1989, Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals presents a stimulating debate between three scientists and three philosophers about the significance and nature of goal-directed and intentional behaviour. At one extreme David McFarland brings into radical question the need for either of these concepts, at least in the scientific study of animal behaviour. At the other extreme, Alan Montefiore argues that such concepts are indispensable to any explication of the meaningful use of language and that we must therefore acknowledge their importance in understanding the nature of human behaviour. Denis Noble uses arguments drawn from computer science and physiology to show that it is incorrect to regard intentions as causes of neural events, even though it is correct to regard intentionality as responsible for our actions. Shawn Lockery outlines how intentional behaviour might be subjected to physiological study. Kathy Wilkes widens the debate by asking some basic questions about the nature of explanation and finally, Daniel Dennett argues how the study of animal behaviour might inform research in Artificial Intelligence.
This book will be a useful resource for scholars and researchers of cognitive science, philosophy, psychology, linguistics and physiology.
Contents
Preface Acknowledgements Part I: Introduction 1. General Introduction 2. Philosophical Background 3. Scientific Introduction Part II: The Positions Stated 4. Goals, No-Goals, Own Goals 5. Intentions and Causes 6. Intentional Actions and Physiology 7. Cognitive Ethology: Hunting for Bargains or a Wild Goose Chase? 8. Representation, Functionalism, and Simple Living Systems 9. Representations and Explanations Part III: The Positions Debated 10. Narrow Intentions 11. Explanations - How not to Miss the Point 12. The Teleological Imperative 13. Comments 14. Round Two 15. What Do Intentions Do? Part IV: A Challenge Renewed 16. Swan Song of a Phoenix Bibliography Further Reading Notes on authors
