Full Description
The New Dual State examines how authoritarian regimes can institutionalize judicial autonomy without relinquishing ultimate political control. Extending the dual state theory beyond its classical and contemporary formulations, Yueduan Wang argues that the consolidation of autocratic authority can clarify and stabilize the boundary between legal order and arbitrary power, thereby permitting limited judicial independence. Using China as the central case, the book shows how political centralization enabled the regime to insulate judges from local officials, suppress unsanctioned extrajudicial interventions, and channel politically sensitive disputes away from the courts through the repression of legal activism and the expansion of state-led mediation. These measures have produced a system in which courts demonstrate increasing professionalism and autonomy in routine cases, while the regime retains decisive authority over politically salient matters. Grounded in extensive fieldwork and framed by comparative legal theory, the book advances a compelling framework for understanding authoritarian legality.
Contents
Part I. Foundations: 1. Autonomy in duality: judicial (in)dependence under authoritarianism; 2. The Chinese case: judicial politics under Xi Jinping; Part II. Autonomy Through Discipline: 3. Reforming the courts: centralization and accountability under Xi; 4. 'Rule of law is the new political line': party campaigns against extrajudicial intervention; 5. Institutionalizing lawless: formalizing political control over the courts; Part III. Depoliticization Through Dejudicialization: 6. Taming legal mavericks: repression and cooptation of court-based resistance; 7. From courtroom to neighborhood committee: diverting disputes from legal channels; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. More autocracy, more autonomy? The political logic of the new dual state; Epilogue: comparative reflections; Appendix A. Data and methodology; Appendix B. Glossary; Appendix C. Key dates and events; Bibliography; Index.
