Full Description
Why are some deeply divided societies able to craft stable constitutional regimes while others have failed and continue to be mired in endless communal conflict? This puzzle constitutes the central question this book seeks to address. This book is directed at scholars who wish to understand the riddles of constitutional performance in deeply divided societies, and those who are interested in understanding Afghanistan's troubled constitutional history. By providing the most comprehensive account of the drafting and performance of Afghanistan's 2004 constitution, the book is aimed at scholars who want to understand the nuances of the process that produced the Constitution and evaluate its performance with fresh eyes. The world is full of divided, post-conflict societies which continue to witness tragic violent conflicts. This book is thus a valuable resource for policy makers who are currently grappling with how to approach thorny problems of constitutional design and nation-building in these societies.
Contents
Introduction; 1. A new model for coordinating deeply divided societies; 2. From 'Yaghistan' to Afghanistan: the foundations of the Afghan State and its peoples; 3. Incomplete constitutions and coordination: a tale of two early constitutions in Afghanistan; 4. Rethinking Afghanistan's 'finest (1964) constitution as a coordination device; 5. Short-lived regimes and coordination failures, 1973-2001; 6. The veterans of failed constitution-making assemble: drafting the 2004 constitution; 7. The rise and fall of the 2004 constitution as a coordination device: the incomplete constitution in practice; Conclusion; Bibliography.
