Full Description
Since the mid-20th century, organizational theorists have increasingly distanced themselves from the study of core societal power centers and important policy issues of the day. This has been driven by a shift away from the study of organizations, politics, and society and towards a more narrow focus on instrumental exchange and performance. As a result, our field has become increasingly impotent as a critical voice and contributor to policy. For a contemporary example, witness our inability as a field to make sense of the recent U.S. mortgage meltdown and concomitant global financial crisis. It is not that economic and organizational sociologists have nothing to say. The problem is that while we have a great deal of knowledge about finance, the economy, entrepreneurship and corporations, we fail to address how the knowledge in our field can be used to contribute to important policy issues of the day. This double-volume brings together some of the very top scholars in the world in economic and organizational sociology to address the recent global financial crisis debates and struggles around how to organize economies and societies around the world.
Contents
PART A INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL 2 VOLUME SET Chapter 1: Markets on Trial: Towards a Policy-Oriented Economic Sociology, Michael Lounsbury (University of Alberta) and Paul M. Hirsch (Northwestern University) SECTION I: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS UNFOLDING Chapter 2: The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, Neil Fligstein and Adam Goldstein (University of California at Berkeley) Chapter 3: The Structure of Confidence and the Collapse of Lehman Brothers, Richard Swedberg (Cornell University) Chapter 4: The Role of Ratings in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Art of Corporate and the Science of Consumer Credit Rating, Akos Rona-Tas (University of California at San Diego) and Stefanie Hiss (University of Jena) Chapter 5: Knowledge and Liquidity: Institutional and Cognitive Foundations of the SubPrime Crisis Bruce Carruthers (Northwestern University) Chapter 6: Terminal Isomorphism and the Self-Destructive Potential of Success: Lessons from Sub-Prime Mortgage Origination and Securitization, Jo-Ellen Pozner (University of California at Berkeley), Mary Katherine Stimmler (University of California at Berkeley) & Paul Hirsch (Northwestern University) SECTION II: THE NORMAL ACCIDENT PERSPECTIVE Chapter 7: A Normal Accident Analysis of the Mortgage Meltdown, Don Palmer and Michael Maher (University of California at Davis) Chapter 8: The Global Crisis of 2007-2009: Markets, Politics, and Organizations, Mauro F. Guillen (University of Pennsylvania) and Sandra L. Suarez (Temple University) Chapter 9: Regulating and Redesigning Finance: Market Architectures, Normal Accidents and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, Marc Schneiberg (Reed College) and Tim Bartley (Indiana University) Chapter 10: The Meltdown was not an Accident, Charles Perrow (Yale University)
