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Full Description
For eight years President Dwight Eisenhower claimed to pursue peace and national security. Yet his policies entrenched the United States in a seemingly permanent cold war, a spiraling nuclear arms race, and a deepening state of national insecurity. Ira Chernus uncovers the key to this paradox in Eisenhower's unwavering commitment to a consistent way of talking, in private as well as in public, about the cold war rivalry. Contrary to what most historians have concluded, Eisenhower never aimed at any genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He discourse always assumed that the United States would forever face an enemy bent on destroying it, making national insecurity a permanent way of life. The "peace" he sought was only an endless process of managing apocalyptic threats, a permanent state of "apocalypse management," intended to give the United States unchallenged advantage in every arena of the cold war. The goal and the discourse that supported it were inherently self-defeating. Yet the discourse is Eisenhower's most enduring legacy, for it has shaped U.S. foreign policy ever since, leaving us still a national insecurity state.
Contents
Contents Introduction: On Eisenhower And Discourse 000 Part I: The Origins Of Apocalypse Management 1 Ideological Foundations 000 2 "The Chance For Peace" 000 3 Candor And Korea 000 4 The New Look And "Atoms For Peace" 000 Part II: The Trials Of Apocalypse Management 5 The Trap 000 6 The President And The Bomb, 1953 - 1955 000 Part III: The Triumph Of Apocalypse Management 7 The Formosa Straits Crisis 000 8 "Open Skies" 000 9 The Spirit Of Geneva 000 Part IV: The Ironies Of Apocalypse Management 10 Beyond Geneva 000 11 Mutual Security And The Military Budget 000 12 The President And The Bomb, 1956 - 1960 000 13 The Ironies Of Disarmament 000 Conclusion: The National Insecurity State 000 Abbreviations 000 Notes 000 Bibliography 000 Index 000
