基本説明
Discusses the concept of personal identity and the moral dimensions of treating brain disease and injury.
Full Description
This book brings together some of the best minds in neurology and philosophy to discuss the concept of personal identity and the moral dimensions of treating brain disease and injury. The contributors engage a crucial question: When an individual's personality changes radically because of disease or injury, should this changed individual be treated as the same person? Rapid advances in brain science are expanding knowledge of human memory, emotion, and cognition and pointing the way toward new approaches for the prevention and treatment of devastating illnesses and disabilities. Through case studies of Alzheimer disease, frontotemporal dementia, deep brain stimulation, and steroid psychosis, the contributors highlight relevant ethical and social concerns that clinicians, researchers, and ethicists are likely to encounter. Personal Identity and Fractured Selves represents the first formal collaboration between the Brain Sciences Institute and the Berman Institute of Bioethics, both at the Johns Hopkins University.
The book asks neuroscientists and philosophers to address important questions on the topic of personal identity in an effort to engage both fields in fruitful conversation. Contributors: Samuel Barondes, M.D., University of California, San Francisco; David M. Blass, M.D., Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine; Patrick Duggan, A.B., Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics; Ruth R. Faden, Ph.D., M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Ph.D., University of California, Santa Barbara; Guy M. McKhann, M.D., Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine; John Perry, Ph.D., Stanford University; Carol Rovane, Ph.D., Columbia University; Alan Regenberg, M.Be., Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics; Marya Schechtman, Ph.D., University of Illinois at Chicago; Maura Tumulty, Ph.D., Colgate University
Contents
List of Contributors
Preface
Introduction. A "Two Cultures" Phrasebook
Part I: Foundations
Chapter 1. How Philosophers Think about Persons, Personal Identity, and the Self
Chapter 2. Toward a Neurobiology of Personal Identity
Chapter 3. Case Studies
Part II: Philosophers Hold Forth
Chapter 4. Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-narrative and Personal Identity
Chapter 5. Personal Identity and Choice
Chapter 6. Diminished and Fractured Selves
Part III: Neuroscientists Push Back
Chapter 7. After Locke: Darwin, Freud, and Psychiatric Assessment
Chapter 8. The Fictional Self
Conclusion: Common Threads
References
Index
